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I. INTRODUCTION 
It bears mentioning that the blanket prohibition on the 
admission of autopsy reports urged by defendant could result 
in practical difficulties for murder prosecutions. If, for 
example, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy 
passes away before a perpetrator is apprehended and tried, 
barring the use in evidence of the autopsy report could, in 
some situations, effectively amount to a statute of limitations 
on murder, where none otherwise exists.1 
The forensic autopsy report is an important component of a 
criminal homicide prosecution.2 The report, which is used to 
memorialize the cause3 and manner of death4 under the auspices of a 
coroner’s or medical examiner’s office,5 constitutes a significant 
phase of a death investigation that is used “to (hopefully) convict the 
guilty and exonerate the innocent.”6 
                                                                                                             
 1. People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428, 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
 2. Medicolegal autopsies are conducted to determine the cause of death; 
assist with the determination of the manner of death as natural, suicide, homicide, 
or accident; collect medical evidence that may be useful for public health or the 
courts; and develop information that may be useful for reconstructing how the 
person received a fatal injury. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 248 (2009).  
The autopsy is a post-mortem medical examination for studying the 
pathologic changes present and determining the cause of death. The 
autopsy includes three kinds of examinations: an inspection of the 
external body; an examination and dissection of the internal organs and 
vital structures; and a microscopic examination of selected tissues.  
Cheryl M. Reichert & Virginia L. Kelly, Prognosis for the Autopsy, HEALTH AFF., 
May 1985, at 82, 82. 
 3. “The cause of death is the trauma, disease, or combination of conditions 
that terminated the person’s life.” ANDRE A. MOENSSENS, BETTY LAYNE 
DESPORTES & CARL N. EDWARDS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
CASES § 14.09, at 666 (6th ed. 2013). 
 4. Manner of death may be characterized as “natural, accident, suicide, 
homicide, and undetermined.” Id. § 14.10, at 666. 
 5. For an excellent description of the offices of the coroner and medical 
examiner, including their roles and history, see generally Randy Hanzlick & Debra 
Combs, Medical Examiner and Coroner Systems, 279 JAMA 870 (1998); Randy 
Hanzlick, Medical Examiners, Coroners, and Public Health: A Review and 
Update, 130 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 1274 (2006); Randy 
Hanzlick, The Conversion of Coroner Systems to Medical Examiner Systems in the 
United States: A Lull in the Action, 28 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 279 
(2007). 
 6. MOENSSENS ET. AL., supra note 3, § 14.03, at 654. See also Reichart & 
Kelly, supra note 2, at 85 (“The correlation of autopsy findings with criminal 
investigations is an invaluable asset for a just society. Forensic autopsy findings 
frequently implicate the guilty and vindicate the innocent.”). To demonstrate the 
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The trial testimony of the pathologist7 and reference to the 
pathologist’s forensic autopsy report implicate significant evidentiary 
issues. First, the forensic autopsy report is a document prepared 
subsequent to the autopsy, out of court, and is offered in court for the 
truth of the matter it asserts. The examining pathologist is the out-of-
court declarant. Therefore, the forensic autopsy report is classic 
hearsay,8 which is inadmissible unless it fits within a recognized 
exception to the hearsay rule.9 Typically, finding an applicable 
exception is not a difficult obstacle to overcome, as forensic autopsy 
reports may constitute business records10 (records of a regularly 
conducted activity), public/official records,11 or may simply fall 
within a state statutory hearsay exception created for the purpose of 
the admission of forensic autopsy reports.12 
The second evidentiary issue is far more complicated and requires 
attention to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.13 
The Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;  
 
                                                                                                             
 
potential significance of the forensic autopsy report in death investigations, “[i]n 
2011, an estimated 14,612 persons were murdered in the United States.” FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT CRIME IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 2011 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ 
crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/violent-crime/murdermain_final.pdf. 
 7. A “pathologist” is “[a] physician trained in the medical specialty of 
pathology and the medical subspecialty of forensic pathology (the examination of 
persons who die suddenly, unexpectedly, or violently).” MOENSSENS ET. AL., 
supra note 3, § 14.02, at 651.  
Forensic pathology is the study of the diseases and injuries of the 
community. Forensic pathologists have been described as detectives in 
white coats. No other field of medicine supplies the intellectual 
challenge of forensic pathology, as it requires a working knowledge of 
diagnosis and treatment in every specialty of medicine plus an 
understanding of such nonmedical fields as criminology, criminalistics, 
engineering, highway design, police science, and political science. 
Ronald K. Wright & Larry G. Tate, Forensic Pathology – Last Stronghold Of The 
Autopsy, 1 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 57 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
 8. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c). 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 803, 804. 
 10. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 11. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). 
 12. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-5.1 (West 2002). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.14 
It is the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment that is of 
particular relevance here. 
The classic forensic pathology testimony at a criminal homicide 
trial comes in one of two basic forms: (1) the examining 
pathologist—the pathologist who performed the forensic autopsy on 
the victim and prepared the autopsy report—is the in-court witness 
who refers to the autopsy report, explains its findings and 
conclusions, and is subject to cross-examination by the defendant15 
or (2) the in-court witness is a “surrogate” pathologist, one who was 
not the examining pathologist, from the office of the coroner or 
medical examiner. The surrogate pathologist relies on the examining 
pathologist’s autopsy report and offers a professional opinion at trial 
as an expert witness.16 Here, the defendant is unable to confront and 
cross-examine the examining pathologist. Yet, the prosecution may 
seek to offer the autopsy report in evidence as the report, classic 
hearsay,17 fits nicely within a recognized exception to the hearsay 
rule.18 
The second scenario has created the constitutional controversy 
to which this Article is directed. Prior to the opinion of the Supreme 
Court in Crawford v. Washington,19 the surrogate pathologist’s 
reference to the autopsy report authored by the examining 
pathologist and the admissibility of the autopsy report were 
governed by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ohio v. Roberts.20 The 
Court in Roberts pronounced that the Confrontation Clause did not 
prohibit the admission of an unavailable witness’s statement against 
a criminal defendant if the statement bore “adequate indicia of 
reliability.”21 A hearsay statement made by an unavailable declarant 
met the Roberts standard if it fell within a firmly rooted hearsay 
                                                                                                             
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Burr v. Lassiter, 513 F. App’x 327, 334, 337 (4th Cir. 2013); 
People v. Avila, 208 P.3d 634, 647 (Cal. 2009); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 
609 (Neb. 2003). 
 16. See People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Ill. 2012). 
 17. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c). 
 18. FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8); or applicable state statute pertaining to the 
admissibility of forensic autopsy reports. 
 19. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 20. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 
36. 
 21. Id. at 66. 
122 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
exception.22 The forensic autopsy report fit within a recognized 
hearsay exception, and the evidentiary and constitutional problems 
were avoided.23 
Crawford v. Washington dramatically altered the Confrontation 
Clause–hearsay landscape.24 In Crawford, the Supreme Court 
pronounced that a recognized hearsay exception applicable to an 
unavailable declarant does not trump the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause if the hearsay statement is “testimonial,” a 
description suggesting that the statement has potential evidentiary 
significance.25 This ruling has created a stir in the Supreme Court. 
Despite the curious suggestion of one state supreme court,26 the 
Supreme Court of the United States has not resolved the issue of 
whether a forensic autopsy report is testimonial. There is a split 
among the circuit courts of appeals and among state courts on this 
topic. 
This Article examines the landscape of legal issues involved in 
determining whether the presence at trial of a surrogate pathologist, 
whose testimony refers to a forensic autopsy report prepared by the 
examining pathologist and provides the foundation for the 
admissibility of the forensic autopsy report, implicates the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. This Article 
concludes that the practice of surrogate testimony and admission of 
the forensic autopsy report, well known and often required in 
criminal homicide prosecutions, implicates and violates the 
Confrontation Clause. 
II. LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE FORENSIC AUTOPSY REPORT 
A. Hearsay 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as follows: 
(a) Statement. “Statement” means a person’s oral 
assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if 
the person intended it as an assertion. 
                                                                                                             
 22. Id. See also Ralph Ruebner & Timothy Scahill, Crawford v. Washington, 
the Confrontation Clause, and Hearsay: A New Paradigm for Illinois Evidence 
Law, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 703, 705 (2005). 
 23. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-5.1 (West 2002); FED. R. EVID. 
803(6), (8). 
 24. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 25. Id. at 68. 
 26. State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009) (citing Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009)). 
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(b) Declarant. “Declarant” means the person who made 
the statement. 
(c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” means a statement that: 
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at 
the current trial or hearing; and 
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted in the statement.27 
When a party offers a forensic autopsy report into evidence at a 
criminal homicide trial, hearsay becomes an issue. The forensic 
autopsy report prepared by the examining forensic pathologist should 
include two basic components: (1) the forensic autopsy findings28 and 
(2) “the interpretations of the forensic pathologist including cause and 
manner of death.”29 More specifically, the National Association of 
Medical Examiners30 recommends that the forensic pathologist 
undertake the following tasks in reporting autopsy results: 
• prepare a written narrative report for each postmortem 
examination; • include the date, place, and time of examination; • include the name of deceased, if known; • include the case number; • include observations of the external examination and, 
when performed, the internal examination; • include a separate section on injuries; • include a description of internal and external injuries; • include descriptions of findings in sufficient detail to 
support diagnoses, opinions, and conclusions; • include a list of the diagnoses and interpretations in 
forensic autopsy reports; • include cause of death; • include manner of death; • include the name and title of each forensic pathologist; 
and • sign and date each postmortem examination report.31 
                                                                                                             
 27. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c). 
 28. NAT’L ASS’N OF MED. EXAM’RS, FORENSIC AUTOPSY PERFORMANCE 
STANDARDS 26 (2012), available at https://netforum.avectra.com/temp/Client 
Images /NAME /eed6c85d-5871-4da1-aef3-abfc9bb80b92.pdf [hereinafter 
NAME STANDARDS]. 
 29. Id. 
 30. “[T]he national professional organization of physician medical 
examiners.” About NAME, NAT’L ASS’N OF MED. EXAMINERS, https://netforum 
.avectra.com/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=NAME&WebCode=AboutNAME 
(last visited July 2, 2013). 
 31. NAME STANDARDS, supra note 28, at 26. 
124 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
Unquestionably, the forensic autopsy report contains a series of 
assertive statements, prepared by an out-of-court declarant (the 
forensic pathologist), and the report is then offered in evidence at 
trial to prove the truth of the matters asserted in the report. 
Therefore, the forensic autopsy report is hearsay.32 
The next step in determining the admissibility of the forensic 
autopsy report is to determine if it, as hearsay, fits within a 
recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Federal Rules of Evidence 
80333 and 804,34 state counterparts, and special state statutes provide 
the hearsay exceptions. Insofar as the Federal Rules of Evidence are 
concerned, Rule 803(6) provides as follows: 
(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of 
an act, event, condition, opinion or diagnosis if: 
(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or 
from information transmitted by—someone with 
knowledge; 
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted activity of a business, organization, 
occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; 
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that 
activity; 
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of 
the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a 
certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or 
(12) or with a statute permitting certification; and 
(E) neither the source of information nor the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness.35 
Rule 803(8) provides: 
(8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office 
if: 
(A) it sets out: 
(i) the office’s activities; 
(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to 
report, but not including, in a criminal case, a 
matter observed by law-enforcement personnel; 
or 
                                                                                                             
 32. FED. R. EVID. 801. 
 33. FED. R. EVID. 803. 
 34. FED. R. EVID. 804. 
 35. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
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(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a 
criminal case, factual findings from a legally 
authorized investigation; and 
(B) neither the source of information nor other 
circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.36 
Rule 803(6) encompasses the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule,37 which federal circuit courts of appeals have applied 
to forensic autopsy reports.38 Rule 803(8), the public records 
exception, may also apply,39 and state courts have applied their own 
counterparts.40 
Further, some state statutes create an exception to the hearsay 
rule for forensic autopsy reports, such as that in Illinois.41 The 
Illinois statute is of particular interest insofar as it provides a hearsay 
exception for the forensic autopsy report and contemplates the 
testimony of a surrogate witness due to the death of the examining 
pathologist. The Illinois statute provides as follows: 
In any civil or criminal action the records of the coroner’s 
medical or laboratory examiner summarizing and detailing 
the performance of his or her official duties in performing 
medical examinations upon deceased persons or autopsies, 
or both, and kept in the ordinary course of business of the 
coroner’s office, duly certified by the county coroner or 
chief supervisory coroner’s pathologist or medical examiner, 
shall be received as competent evidence in any court of this 
State, to the extent permitted by this Section. These reports, 
specifically including but not limited to the pathologist’s 
protocol, autopsy reports and toxicological reports, shall be 
public documents and thereby may be admissible as prima 
facie evidence of the facts, findings, opinions, diagnoses and 
conditions stated therein. 
 
A duly certified coroner’s protocol or autopsy report, or 
both, complying with the requirements of this Section may 
be duly admitted into evidence as an exception to the 
hearsay rule as prima facie proof of the cause of death of the 
person to whom it relates. The records referred to in this 
Section shall be limited to the records of the results of post-
                                                                                                             
 36. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). 
 37. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 39. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). 
 40. Id. See People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ill. 2012). 
 41. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-5.1 (West 2002). 
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mortem examinations of the findings of autopsy and 
toxicological laboratory examinations. 
 
Persons who prepare reports or records offered in evidence 
hereunder may be subpoenaed as witnesses in civil or 
criminal cases upon the request of either party to the cause. 
However, if such person is dead, the county coroner or a 
duly authorized official of the coroner’s office may testify to 
the fact that the examining pathologist, toxicologist or other 
medical or laboratory examiner is deceased and that the 
offered report or record was prepared by such deceased 
person. The witness must further attest that the medical 
report or record was prepared in the ordinary and usual 
course of the deceased person’s duty or employment in 
conformity with the provisions of this Section.42 
On the assumption that the forensic autopsy report neatly fits 
within a recognized hearsay exception, the first legal issue of 
hearsay has been resolved.43 However, in a criminal homicide 
prosecution, the applicable hearsay exception does not end the quest 
for admissibility. The Confrontation Clause provides the key 
obstacle to admissibility and must be examined.44 
B. The Confrontation Clause 
1. Supreme Court Jurisprudence—Defining “Testimonial” 
As previously mentioned, the admissibility of the forensic 
autopsy report through the trial testimony of a surrogate forensic 
pathologist was more than possible—it was likely—under the Ohio 
v. Roberts standards.45 A hearsay statement made by an unavailable 
declarant that fit within a firmly rooted hearsay exception did not 
run afoul of the Confrontation Clause pursuant to Roberts.46 
Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington and 
changed the Confrontation Clause–hearsay landscape.47 Crawford 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. 
 43. FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8). See also state law counterparts and state statutes 
specifically providing for the admissibility of forensic autopsy reports. 
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 45. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 46. Id. at 66. 
 47. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
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was the first in a series of Supreme Court opinions48 to address the 
concept of “testimonial” hearsay.49 
a. Crawford v. Washington 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court replaced Roberts as the 
standard against which to measure the admission of classic hearsay 
for a criminal prosecution when the out-of-court declarant was 
unavailable for trial and cross-examination by the defendant. It was 
in Crawford that the Supreme Court focused on the concept of 
testimonial hearsay and the Confrontation Clause.50 
Police arrested Crawford in Washington State for stabbing 
Lee.51 Crawford and his wife searched for Lee on the belief that Lee 
had previously attempted to rape his wife.52 Crawford and his wife 
were taken into custody and separately interrogated.53 
Crawford told the police of his belief that Lee was reaching for a 
weapon when Crawford and Lee were fighting prior to the 
stabbing.54 However, Crawford’s wife told a different story about 
the fight—She did not believe that the victim had a weapon.55 
Crawford was charged with assault and attempted murder.56 His 
wife, a non-defendant, asserted the Washington State marital 
privilege and did not testify at trial.57 The police recorded her 
statement, and the prosecution offered it into evidence at Crawford’s 
trial to refute his claim of self-defense.58 Her out-of-court statement 
was obviously offered to prove its truth—that Crawford did not act 
in self-defense and that the victim had no weapon. Therefore, the 
statement of Crawford’s wife was classic hearsay. Crawford’s wife 
admitted having assisted Crawford in finding the victim;59 therefore, 
her statement qualified as a statement against interest, a well-known 
exception to the hearsay rule applicable only when the out-of-court 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. at 68–69; Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828–29 (2006); 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009); Michigan v. Bryant, 
131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 (2011); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 
(2011); Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2243–44 (2012). 
 49. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 38. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 38–39. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 39–40. 
 56. Id. at 40. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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declarant is unavailable to testify at trial.60 Crawford’s wife, by 
asserting the marital privilege, was “unavailable” under the 
Washington State (and Federal) Rules of Evidence. 
Crawford was convicted, but the court of appeals reversed, 
holding that the out-of-court statement of Crawford’s wife did not 
carry the required, particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.61 
The Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Crawford’s 
conviction.62 It held that while the statement of Crawford’s wife did 
not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it did have 
guarantees of trustworthiness because the statements of Crawford 
and his wife were overlapping and interlocking.63 
The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to determine whether the 
State’s use of [the wife’s] statement violated the Confrontation 
Clause.”64 The Crawford Court emphasized that the Confrontation 
Clause applies to witnesses against the accused whose “statements . . . 
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial.”65 As a result, even a hearsay statement by an 
unavailable declarant that fits within a recognized exception to the 
hearsay rule may be inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment if the 
defendant did not have a prior opportunity to confront and cross-
examine the declarant.66 
Therefore, under Crawford, it is essential to know the type or 
quality of hearsay involved—Is it testimonial or not? Testimonial 
hearsay will implicate the Sixth Amendment.67 
Crawford provided insight to the identification of testimonial 
hearsay. Testimonial hearsay includes: 
• prior testimony;68 • depositions;69 • confessions;70 • affidavits;71 
                                                                                                             
 60. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
 61. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41. 
 62. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 664 (Wash. 2002). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
 65. Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754961, at * 3). 
 66. Id. at 68. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J. 
& Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
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• ex parte, in-court testimony;72 • custodial police interrogations;73 and • pre-trial statements by declarants expected to be used 
prosecutorially.74 
Testimonial hearsay does not require actual testimony. There is, 
however, an “official” character of testimonial hearsay. 
Crawford did allude to a form of non-testimonial hearsay that 
relates to the topic of this Article—business records, which by their 
nature are not testimonial.75 Of course, Crawford did not consider 
whether the forensic autopsy report was a business record. 
Ultimately, this Article urges that a forensic autopsy report, even as 
a business record, is testimonial, implicating the Confrontation 
Clause. 
b. Davis v. Washington 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis v. Washington also did 
not address forensic autopsy reports.76  However, the Court’s 
opinion was instructive regarding the definition of “testimonial.” 
The Court focused on the issue of whether a domestic violence 
victim’s statements in response to the interrogation of a 911 operator 
were testimonial.77 Davis contributed the “primary purpose” test to 
the analysis and characterization of testimonial statements.78 If the 
primary purpose of the police interrogation aids an ongoing 
emergency, then the statements are considered non-testimonial.79 
However, if the purpose of the police interrogation is to establish 
evidence relevant to a later criminal prosecution and there is no 
ongoing emergency, then the statements are testimonial.80 Although 
forensic autopsies and their reports may serve multiple purposes, it 
is clear that they constitute important evidence in criminal 
prosecutions.81 
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c. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, addressing the testimonial 
nature of forensic certificates, involved the police detention and 
search of a suspect yielding the seizure of white plastic bags 
containing a substance resembling cocaine.82 Pursuant to 
Massachusetts law, the police submitted the evidence to a state 
laboratory for chemical analysis.83 The defendant was charged with 
distributing and trafficking cocaine.84 At trial, the prosecution offered 
and the court admitted into evidence certificates of forensic analysis 
of the seized substances.85 The forensic analysis identified cocaine.86 
The certificates were notarized and sworn to at the state laboratory.87 
The actual analysts who performed the testing did not testify at 
trial.88 The defendant was found guilty, and the conviction was 
affirmed on appeal.89 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
denied further review, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.90 
The Supreme Court held that the certificates constituted 
testimonial statements.91 They were affidavits that were solemn 
declarations created for the purpose of proving a fact.92 Here, the 
purpose was to provide information regarding the analyzed 
substance, which would lead one to believe that the certificate would 
be available for use at a later trial. 93 
The analysts who performed the forensic testing (but did not 
testify) were witnesses against the defendant. The Supreme Court 
noted that “[c]onfrontation is one means of assuring accurate 
forensic analysis.”94 If the analysts lacked proper training or were 
deficient in their judgment, these failings could be disclosed on 
cross-examination.95 
The Supreme Court referred to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), 
which provides a hearsay exception for records of a regularly 
conducted activity (the business records exception).96 Here, the 
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Supreme Court concluded that the forensic certificates did not 
constitute business records insofar as the “regularly conducted 
business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.”97 
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court alluded to the 
evidentiary status of “results of a coroner’s inquest” and “coroner’s 
reports,” commenting that “whatever the status of coroner’s reports 
at common law in England, they were not accorded any special 
status in American practice.”98 Contrary to the suggestion of one 
state court opinion,99 the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz did not 
opine on the specifics of forensic autopsy reports. The Court did not 
characterize the reports as business records, nor did the Court 
determine if the reports constituted testimonial hearsay. 
d. Michigan v. Bryant 
Michigan v. Bryant is the next case in the series of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence sounding in on the definition of “testimonial” 
hearsay.100 It involved the conviction of the defendant for second-
degree murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of 
a firearm during the commission of a felony.101 The evidentiary 
issue was the admissibility at trial of statements to the police by the 
victim of a shooting; the victim was the out-of-court declarant for 
hearsay purposes.102 
In Bryant, the Supreme Court noted that Crawford v. 
Washington103 left for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of “testimonial.”104 The primary 
contribution of Bryant was to explain the non-testimonial nature of 
the declarant’s statement as it related to an ongoing emergency.105  
e. Bullcoming v. New Mexico 
In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court considered the 
testimonial nature of a laboratory report after the defendant was 
convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol.106 A 
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laboratory analyst performed a blood alcohol analysis, prepared a 
report, and signed a certification.107 However, at trial, this analyst 
did not testify.108 A surrogate analyst, familiar with the forensic 
laboratory reporting process, testified at trial.109 The laboratory 
report certified that the defendant’s blood-alcohol concentration was 
well above the limit for aggravated DWI.110 
The Supreme Court held that surrogate trial testimony by the 
analyst who did not participate in or observe the forensic testing 
violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and that the 
forensic laboratory report was testimonial.111 The Court stated that 
the absence of an oath did not determine if the statement was 
testimonial and that the laboratory report resembled those in 
Melendez-Diaz. 112 
With the Supreme Court opinions in Melendez-Diaz113 and 
Bullcoming114 focusing on the testimonial nature of forensic data 
analysis and forensic reports, one might reasonably predict that the 
authors of forensic reports must anticipate the attempted 
introduction of the reports in evidence and that the reports are 
testimonial. The use of surrogate witnesses precludes a criminal 
defendant from confronting and cross-examining the author of the 
report and, necessarily, implicates the Confrontation Clause. 
Crawford v. Washington made clear that a well-recognized hearsay 
exception will not trump the Sixth Amendment when testimonial 
hearsay is involved.115 Potential evidence developed through 
forensic analysis has an “official” quality and, therefore, appears 
testimonial. Before the predictive process becomes comfortable, this 
Article must address Williams v. Illinois.116 
f. Williams v. Illinois 
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal 
sexual assault, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping.117 
The victim was abducted and raped.118 The police were called, the 
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victim was taken to a hospital, and a sexual assault kit was 
obtained.119 The kit was placed in the custody of the Chicago Police 
and sent to the Illinois State Police Lab.120 At the lab, a forensic 
scientist received the kit and analyzed the evidence, confirming the 
presence of semen on vaginal swabs.121 The kit was resealed and 
placed in an evidence freezer.122 The state lab then sent the vaginal 
swabs to another lab, Cellmark, for DNA testing and produced a 
male DNA profile.123 By this time, the defendant was not yet under 
suspicion for rape.124 
The state police lab undertook a computer search to determine if 
the DNA profile matched entries in the Illinois State DNA 
Database.125 There was a match with defendant’s blood obtained 
from an earlier sample.126 
Thereafter, the police conducted a lineup, and the victim 
identified the defendant.127 The defendant was indicted and tried in a 
bench trial.128 The Cellmark DNA report was not admitted in 
evidence.129 A prosecution expert witness in forensic biology and 
forensic DNA analysis (not the analyst who performed or observed 
the tests) relied on the Cellmark DNA profile for her testimony.130 
Remarkably, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that even if 
the DNA report had been introduced in evidence, a Confrontation 
Clause violation would not have resulted.131 It found that the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause refers to witnesses against an 
accused, focusing on accusing a targeted individual along with 
formalized statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, and confessions.132 The Supreme Court held that the 
Cellmark report was not prepared for the primary purpose of 
accusing a targeted individual.133 Nor was the purpose of the report 
to accuse or create evidence at trial.134 
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It should be noted that Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, refers 
to the problem created by the inadmissibility of forensic autopsy 
reports due to Confrontation Clause violations.135 He stated: 
Autopsies, like the DNA report in this case, are often 
conducted when it is not yet clear whether there is a 
particular suspect or whether the facts found in the autopsy 
will ultimately prove relevant in a criminal trial. Autopsies 
are typically conducted soon after death. And when, say, a 
victim’s body has decomposed, repetition of the autopsy 
may not be possible. What is to happen if the medical 
examiner dies before trial? Is the Confrontation Clause 
effectively to function as a statute of limitations for 
murder?136 
Justice Breyer’s comments do not refer to the skill, judgment, and 
subjectivity involved in the performance of the autopsy and 
preparation of the autopsy report. These factors should play a 
prominent role in the determination of the testimonial nature of 
forensic autopsy reports. 
Williams is a curious opinion in multiple respects. The Supreme 
Court essentially dismissed the hearsay issue by focusing on expert 
testimony.137 The expert testifying at trial was subject to cross-
examination about the opinions offered at trial.138 The DNA profile 
(the out-of-court statement), in the Supreme Court’s view, was not 
offered in court for its truth but only to provide an explanation for 
the expert’s opinions.139 This seems a contorted view of hearsay. If 
the DNA report was untrue, why would an in-court expert rely on it? 
That the defendant was not charged with a crime by the time the 
forensic testing was undertaken really begs the question of the 
testimonial nature of the DNA report. Any forensic scientist 
undertaking testing that may result in the identification of a criminal 
suspect must anticipate that the test results may constitute evidence 
in a criminal prosecution. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals very recently made a 
comment on the unsettling nature of the Williams opinion in United 
States v. Maxwell.140 The Maxwell court noted that “the [Williams’s] 
Court’s 4-1-4 division left no clear guidance about how exactly an 
expert must phrase its testimony about the results of testing 
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performed by another analyst in order for the testimony to be 
admissible.”141 
State supreme court justices have not been shy in commenting 
on the uncertainty and ambiguity of Supreme Court opinions 
pertaining to forensic documents and the Confrontation Clause.142 
How much formality is required for testimonial hearsay? Must a 
primary evidentiary purpose completely overshadow other possible 
purposes of a statement? Why is it not fair to conclude that the 
authors of all forensic documentation in general, and autopsy reports 
in specific, must anticipate that they will be introduced in evidence 
in a criminal prosecution? A highly respected legal scholar 
predicted, “[T]he Supreme Court will hold [another] round . . . in the 
battle over the Confrontation Clause implications of forensic lab 
reports.”143 
What, then, is the fate of the forensic autopsy report prepared by 
the examining pathologist but testified about by a surrogate 
pathologist? Certainly, a forensic pathologist must anticipate that the 
forensic autopsy report will constitute evidence. A forensic autopsy 
report may be issued before a suspect is charged with homicide. 
Should that fact impact the determination of the report as testimonial 
or non-testimonial? In the absence of more cogent guidance by the 
Supreme Court, it is necessary to examine the opinions of the circuit 
courts of appeals and state courts that have addressed this issue. 
III. POST-CRAWFORD JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF 
APPEALS 
This Section examines the jurisprudence of the circuit courts of 
appeals. The purpose of this exercise is to use these opinions to 
predict or forecast future action of the Supreme Court should it take 
up the admissibility of forensic autopsy reports through the 
testimony of surrogate forensic pathologists. 
A. First Circuit 
1. United States v. De La Cruz 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has 
addressed the precise issue that is the subject of this Article. In 
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United States v. De La Cruz, the defendant was convicted of drug-
related charges, including the distribution of heroin causing the drug 
user’s death.144 At trial, an expert medical examiner testified for the 
prosecution.145 He did not perform the autopsy on the victim.146 His 
testimony relied on the autopsy report prepared by the examining 
pathologist.147 Defendant objected to the testimony on 
Confrontation Clause grounds, urging that the autopsy report was 
testimonial.148 
The court of appeals utilized a classic hearsay analysis and held 
that the forensic autopsy report was a business record insofar as it 
was “made in the ordinary course of business by a medical examiner 
who is required by law to memorialize what he or she saw and did 
during an autopsy.”149 The character of the forensic autopsy report, 
the First Circuit concluded, “involves, in principal part, a careful and 
contemporaneous reporting of a series of steps taken and facts found 
by a medical examiner during an autopsy.”150 The court then relied 
on Crawford v. Washington151 and opined that it excluded business 
records from its “reach.”152 Consequently, the opinion of the court in 
De La Cruz teaches that business records are not testimonial.153 
Of course, De La Cruz does not address why certain business 
records cannot be testimonial. It does not address whether the 
examining forensic pathologist should anticipate that the autopsy 
report would constitute trial evidence. 
The real basis of the De La Cruz opinion may be the court of 
appeals’s references to the post-Crawford New York state court 
opinion in People v. Durio.154 There, the court, in finding an autopsy 
report non-testimonial, focused on a practical problem encountered 
in criminal prosecutions involving autopsies—the passage of time 
contributing to the unavailability at trial of the examining 
pathologist who performed the autopsy and prepared the forensic 
autopsy report.155 The Durio court stated: “Certainly it would be 
against society’s interests to permit the unavailability of the medical 
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examiner who prepared the report to preclude the prosecution of a 
homicide case.”156 
The De La Cruz opinion is, therefore, one based on expediency 
and practicality. The court was concerned about crippling criminal 
prosecutions through the use of surrogate or expert forensic 
pathology witnesses.157 
To the extent that the vitality of De La Cruz is reliant on Durio, 
that vitality may now be subject to question. In 2008, the Court of 
Appeals of New York in People v. Rawlins rejected one of the 
foundations of Durio, that documents encompassed by the business 
record hearsay exception are not testimonial.158 Although Rawlins 
did not concern forensic autopsy evidence, the court made clear that 
it did not approve of a bright-line, non-testimonial characterization 
of business records.159 
2. Nardi v. Pepe 
The First Circuit revisited the topic in 2011 in Nardi v. Pepe.160 
In Nardi, the defendant was convicted of murder in Massachusetts, 
and his conviction was affirmed in 2008,161 prior to the U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions in Melendez-Diaz162 and Bullcoming.163 
The U.S. district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, but it granted a certificate of appealability.164 Nardi appealed 
to the First Circuit.165 
Nardi was convicted of killing his mother.166 An autopsy was 
performed, and the report “concluded that the cause of death was 
consistent with asphyxia by suffocation.”167 The examining 
pathologist had retired, suffered a medical condition, and could not 
attend the trial.168 A surrogate pathologist, not involved in the 
victim’s autopsy, testified at trial for the prosecution.169 After the 
surrogate pathologist reviewed the autopsy report, he “testified to 
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several facts derived from the autopsy report” and to the conclusion 
of the examining pathologist that the victim was suffocated.170 
On direct review of the conviction, the Supreme Judicial Court 
(SJC) of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction and rejected the 
Confrontation Clause claim.171 The SJC held that the testifying 
pathologist appropriately offered his opinion, but insofar as he 
revealed portions of the examining pathologist’s autopsy report, that 
portion of the surrogate pathologist’s testimony did violate Nardi’s 
Confrontation Clause rights.172 
As to the petition for habeas corpus, the certificate of 
appealability issued by the U.S. district court focused on this issue: 
“whether it was clearly established law at the time of Nardi’s trial 
that an autopsy report was inadmissible testimonial hearsay and, if 
so, whether a testifying expert’s opinion may rely on inadmissible 
[testimonial] hearsay.”173 
The First Circuit held that Crawford174 “did not ‘clearly 
establish’ that either the autopsy report or [the surrogate 
pathologist’s] opinion in partial reliance upon it were inadmissible 
under the Confrontation Clause.”175 The First Circuit discussed the 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions in Melendez-Diaz176 and 
Bullcoming,177 noted that autopsy reports could fit within either 
analysis, and concluded that “it is uncertain how the [Supreme] 
Court would resolve the question.”178 This uncertainty exists even 
when using the “primary purpose test” emphasized in Bullcoming.179 
Therefore, the First Circuit, holding that it could not resolve the 
testimonial–non-testimonial dilemma through the application of 
Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming, found that Crawford did 
not bar the admissibility of the surrogate pathologist’s testimony and 
the forensic autopsy report, affirmed Nardi’s conviction.180 
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B. Second Circuit 
1. United States v. Feliz 
In United States v. Feliz, a post-Crawford, pre-Melendez-Diaz 
and Bullcoming case, the Second Circuit considered a conviction 
for, among other crimes, conspiring in the commission of murder in 
aid of racketeering.181 “[T]o establish the manner and cause of 
death,” the prosecution offered autopsy reports in evidence through a 
surrogate medical examiner.182 The trial court admitted the autopsy 
reports as business records.183 
The Second Circuit rather easily dispatched the Confrontation 
Clause issue, holding “that a statement properly admitted under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) cannot be testimonial because a 
business record is fundamentally inconsistent with what the 
Supreme Court has suggested comprise the defining characteristics 
of testimonial evidence.”184 The court went to great lengths in 
attempting to characterize a forensic medical examiner as a treating 
physician whose record of patient treatment would not be composed 
for use at trial.185 Further, even though a forensic pathologist may be 
aware that his or her autopsy report “may be available for later use 
at trial,” the Second Circuit concluded that forensic autopsy reports 
constitute business records and are, therefore, non-testimonial.186 
Additionally, the Second Circuit held that forensic autopsy reports 
constitute records within the public records exception to the hearsay 
rule187 and are non-testimonial.188 
2. United States v. Burden 
United States v. Burden did not involve a murder conviction or a 
forensic autopsy.189 The Second Circuit, did, however, address the 
definition of “testimonial statements.”190 In its opinion, the court 
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referred to its opinion in Feliz,191 which held that forensic autopsy 
reports were not testimonial.192 
3. Vega v. Walsh 
Vega involved a request for federal habeas corpus relief from a 
New York State murder conviction in 2002.193 By the time the 
conviction was affirmed on appeal in the New York State court 
system,194 Crawford195 had been decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, but Melendez-Diaz196 and Bullcoming197 had not.198 
Although a forensic autopsy report was not admitted in evidence 
at trial, a surrogate medical examiner was allowed to testify about 
the results of the autopsy.199 The testifying medical examiner did 
state that, “the prosecution’s theory of [the victim’s] death . . . was 
consistent with the autopsy results.”200 This testimony was the 
subject of an issue raised by the habeas petition—Did the admission 
of the surrogate medical examiner’s testimony violate the 
defendant’s confrontation rights?201 
The Second Circuit paid homage to its opinion in Feliz holding 
“that autopsy reports are not testimonial and are admissible as public 
and business records.”202 It noted that Crawford was the controlling 
Supreme Court jurisprudence at the time the state court system 
affirmed the defendant’s conviction and that the admission in 
evidence of the surrogate’s testimony was permissible under 
Crawford.203 
The Second Circuit also noted that Crawford did not 
exhaustively define or provide examples of testimonial 
statements.204 The court was obliged to refer to non-prosecutorial 
uses of forensic autopsy reports, presumably to rebut the argument 
that the medical examiner can anticipate that an autopsy report will 
constitute courtroom evidence.205 
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4. United States v. James 
Most recently, in United States v. James, the Second Circuit 
directly addressed the issues on which this Article focuses. Here, the 
court considered the defendants’s convictions of multiple crimes, 
including murder.206 A surrogate medical examiner testified at trial 
regarding a forensic autopsy performed by another medical examiner, 
and autopsy reports were admitted in evidence.207 The court reviewed 
the post-Crawford208 Supreme Court jurisprudence—Melendez-
Diaz,209 Bullcoming,210 and Williams211—and held that forensic 
autopsy reports are not testimonial “because they were not created 
‘for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial.’” 212 
The court reexamined its opinion in Feliz213 and its conclusions 
therein, that autopsy reports were business records (exceptions to the 
hearsay rule) pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) and 
public records (exceptions to the hearsay rule) pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 803(8).214 It examined the post-Crawford215 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, in search of guidance in 
defining “testimonial.” The court found no assistance in the 
Williams216 plurality opinion regarding the “primary purpose” 
test.217 
How, then, did the James court conclude that the forensic 
autopsy report was non-testimonial? The court examined “the 
particular relationship between the Office of the Chief Medical 
Examiner (OCME) and law enforcement both generally and in this 
particular case.”218 It noted that the victim’s autopsy was completed, 
and the autopsy report was prepared “before any criminal 
investigation into [the victim’s] death had begun.”219 In the court’s 
opinion, the medical examiner did not expect a resulting criminal 
investigation. The autopsy report “was not prepared primarily to 
create a record for use at a criminal trial.”220 
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A final point should be made about the James majority opinion. 
It referred to the victim’s autopsy as “routine.”221 This 
characterization merits later comment as this Article urges that 
forensic autopsy reports are testimonial (and not routine). 
The concurring opinion takes exception with the holding that the 
forensic autopsy report was non-testimonial.222 The concurrence 
distills the Supreme Court jurisprudence and identifies “three key 
considerations for determining if a statement is testimonial” as 
follows:223 
(1) “Testimony is a solemn declaration or affirmation made 
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”224 
(2) “[T]he statement must have been made in a way that is 
sufficiently solemn so as to make it more like ‘a formal 
statement to government officers’ rather than ‘a casual 
remark to an acquaintance.’”225 
(3) “[T]he statement must reasonably be understood as 
being ‘available for use at a later trial.’”226 
The concurrence applied these considerations and easily found 
that they were satisfied.227 The forensic autopsy report was “created 
to establish facts regarding the death of [the victim],” including 
components pertaining to forensic description, analysis, and cause of 
death.228 Next, the forensic autopsy report was “sufficiently solemn” 
as it was created pursuant to applicable law.229 Lastly, the findings 
of the autopsy report, including that the victim may have been 
poisoned, would lead “a reasonable medical examiner [to anticipate] 
that the autopsy report could be used prosecutorially.”230 
Two additional points raised by the concurrence merit comment. 
First, the forensic autopsy report, when admitted in evidence, 
functions as a witness at trial.231 Next, referring to the Eleventh 
Circuit opinion in Ignasiak,232 the concurrence emphasized that the 
forensic autopsy report is “the product of the skill, methodology, 
and judgment of the highly trained examiner[] who actually 
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performed the autopsy.”233 This speaks against the concept of a 
routine autopsy and a report that merely communicates objective 
data. As this Article will later show, this attribute of the forensic 
autopsy report may be the most significant in implicating the 
Confrontation Clause.234 
C. Sixth Circuit 
In Mitchell v. Kelly, a recent per curiam, unpublished 
disposition, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered the 
admissibility of a forensic autopsy report and the testimony of a 
surrogate coroner’s physician.235 A jury convicted Mitchell of 
murder and other crimes in 2005 in the Ohio State court system.236 
His petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied, and “[t]he 
district court granted Mitchell a certificate of appealability regarding 
his Confrontation Clause claim.”237 
The procedure at trial was a familiar one. A surrogate 
pathologist testified, and the forensic autopsy report was admitted in 
evidence as a business record.238 In disposing of the habeas petition, 
“the district court determined that the state courts did not 
unreasonably refuse to extend Crawford v. Washington, to exclude 
the autopsy report admitted at Mitchell’s trial.”239 
The Mitchell court made clear that under Ohio law, “autopsy 
reports are admissible as nontestimonial business records.”240 The 
Sixth Circuit correctly noted “the lack of Supreme Court precedent 
establishing that an autopsy report is testimonial.”241 
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D. Ninth Circuit 
In McNeiece v. Lattimore, an unpublished disposition of a 
habeas petition, the Ninth Circuit considered a Confrontation Clause 
claim stemming from a pre-Melendez-Diaz242 and Bullcoming243 
conviction.244 Here, “excerpts of an autopsy report showing a 
diagram of the victim’s body with descriptions of the bullet 
wounds” were admitted in evidence pursuant to the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule.245 The court permitted a surrogate 
pathologist to testify to his “own opinions” based on the autopsy 
report.246 On appeal, the state appellate court held the autopsy report 
“non-testimonial” pursuant to Crawford.247 
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit’s review revealed that these 
evidentiary determinations were not contrary to Crawford248 or 
Davis,249 the Supreme Court jurisprudence available as of the time 
of the underlying conviction.250 Further, the Ninth Circuit was not 
impressed with the fact that law enforcement personnel attended the 
victim’s autopsy.251 Of course, the attendance at forensic autopsies 
by law enforcement personnel contributes to the awareness of the 
examining pathologist that the autopsy report is likely to constitute 
evidence at a criminal prosecution. 
E. Tenth Circuit 
In United States v. MacKay, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit considered the appeal from the physician–
defendant’s conviction of unlawfully prescribing controlled 
substances.252 One of the issues on appeal concerned the 
admissibility of an autopsy report resulting from the autopsy of one 
of the defendant’s patients.253 
The physician who performed the autopsy and prepared the 
autopsy report died before trial.254 The prosecution introduced the 
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report in evidence.255 The Chief Medical Examiner, the surrogate, 
testified at trial as to the cause of death.256 A toxicologist who had 
reviewed the autopsy report also testified as to the mechanism of 
death, as did a defense expert.257 In referring to the autopsy report, 
the Tenth Circuit stated that “Dr. Frikke, the doctor who performed 
the autopsy, ‘certified that the death was due to drug toxicity 
poisoning with hydrocodone and oxycodone.’”258 On appeal, the 
defendant “argue[d] the autopsy report’s admission into evidence 
present[ed] a Confrontation Clause issue.”259 
The Government argued that the defendant did not preserve the 
Confrontation Clause issue for review by his failure to object at 
trial.260 The defendant urged that the law changed post-conviction 
due to Bullcoming and Ignasiak.261 However, the Tenth Circuit 
noted that Bullcoming pre-dated defendant’s conviction, and he 
could have objected to the admission of the autopsy report based on 
Bullcoming.262 Additionally, the court noted that defendant was 
unable to prove that the trial court committed plain error in 
admitting the autopsy report.263 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit simply 
did not reach the evidentiary and constitutional issues in MacKay.264   
F. Eleventh Circuit 
In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit decided United States v. Ignasiak, 
an appeal from the defendant’s conviction of health care fraud and 
illegally prescribing controlled substances in violation of the 
Controlled Substances Act.265 The defendant was a medical doctor 
who allegedly “prescribed unnecessary or excessive quantities of 
controlled substances without a legitimate medical purpose and 
‘outside the usual course of professional practice.’”266 Patients of the 
defendant died allegedly as a result of the defendant’s conduct.267 
Autopsies were performed and reports were prepared, but the 
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examining pathologists did not testify at trial.268 The trial court 
admitted into evidence the autopsy reports and testimony about the 
reports.269 There was no evidence to suggest that “the coroners who 
performed the autopsies were unavailable and the accused had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine them.”270 Therefore, the court 
was faced with the classic case of the surrogate medical examiner 
witness at trial.271 
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the autopsy reports were 
admitted in evidence as business records.272 The court reviewed 
Crawford,273 Melendez-Diaz,274 and Bullcoming275 and concluded 
that forensic autopsy reports are testimonial, implicating the 
Confrontation Clause.276 It referred to state court opinions on both 
sides of this issue and the Second Circuit opinion in Feliz.277 The 
Ignasiak court easily dispensed with Feliz as a pre-Melendez-Diaz 
opinion, stating that Feliz “has little persuasive value on this 
issue.”278 Further, it found that the forensic autopsy reports “were 
prepared ‘for use at trial,’” referring to Florida law pertaining to the 
office and responsibilities of medical examiners in the state.279 They 
were “made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial.”280 Therefore, these reports were 
testimonial.281 
Significantly, the Ignasiak court referred to the “medical–legal” 
justification for the defendant’s need to confront and cross-examine 
the pathologist who performs a forensic autopsy.282 It is only 
through confrontation and cross-examination that the defendant may 
explore a forensic pathologist’s skill and judgment.283 In this regard, 
the forensic pathologist is similar to the physician who provides care 
to the living based on the physician’s education, training, 
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experience, skill, and judgment. The court in Ignasiak recognized 
that “autopsy reports are like many other types of forensic evidence 
used in criminal prosecutions.”284 The report “may be invalid or 
unreliable because of the examiner’s errors, omissions, mistakes, or 
bias.”285 This insight critically addresses the thought that forensic 
autopsy reports simply collect objective data and that all 
pathologists would routinely replicate findings contained in the 
report. Surrogate pathology witnesses cannot be effectively cross-
examined regarding the findings of the examining pathologists. 
Surely, this is a compelling Confrontation Clause position. 
G. District of Columbia Circuit 
In United States v. Moore,286 the defendants were convicted of 
multiple crimes, including murder.287 Admitted in evidence were 
“autopsy reports authored by the Office of the Chief Medical 
Examiner of the District of Columbia.”288 The author of the reports 
was unavailable to testify.289 The surrogate witness was the chief of 
the medical examiner’s office, who “neither performed nor observed 
the autopsies and his signature [did] not appear on any of the 
reports.”290 
The D.C. Circuit noted that the application of the Confrontation 
Clause to the admissibility of forensic autopsy reports through a 
surrogate witness “is a question left open in Bullcoming.”291 After 
addressing the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the topic, the court 
held that the forensic autopsy reports were testimonial.292 The 
relevant factors were: the statutory obligation of the medical 
examiner to investigate deaths; the presence of law enforcement 
officers at the autopsies; the participation of law enforcement 
officers in the creation of reports related to the autopsies; and “each 
autopsy found the manner of death to be a homicide caused by 
gunshot wounds.”293 Consequently, the court found that these 
“circumstances . . . would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
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believe that the [autopsy reports] would be available for use at a 
later trial.”294 
To date, the circuit courts of appeals are split on the testimonial 
nature of forensic autopsy reports offered in evidence through 
surrogate witnesses. The First, Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits 
have held these reports to be “non-testimonial” and admissible.295 
The Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have held these reports to be 
“testimonial,” implicating the Confrontation Clause.296 In an effort 
to explore a more complete jurisprudential landscape, a survey of 
state court opinions will be examined. 
IV. POST-CRAWFORD JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE STATES 
A. States Holding Forensic Autopsy Reports to be Testimonial 
1. Massachusetts 
In 2009, the SJC of Massachusetts addressed the admissibility of 
a surrogate medical examiner’s in-court testimony in Commonwealth 
v. Avila.297 The examining pathologist (who conducted the autopsy) 
was not employed by Massachusetts at the time of trial.298 At trial, the 
surrogate medical examiner offered opinions on the cause and manner 
of death, how long it took the victim to die, and “whether the victim 
might have been conscious after each shot was fired.”299 The 
surrogate’s in-court testimony was based upon the examining 
pathologist’s autopsy report and diagram.300 The diagram was 
admitted into evidence, but the autopsy report was not. Despite this 
fact, the Avila court stated that “the substitute medical examiner, as an 
expert witness, is not permitted on direct examination to recite or 
otherwise testify about the underlying factual findings of the 
unavailable medical examiner as contained in the autopsy report.”301 
The testimony of the surrogate medical examiner, in this regard, 
violated the Confrontation Clause.302 
In 2013, the SJC of Massachusetts reaffirmed this position in 
Commonwealth v. Reavis.303 Here, the attending medical examiner 
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was unavailable for trial. A surrogate medical examiner testified and 
opined on the cause of death, based upon “his review of the autopsy 
report, the toxicology report, and the autopsy photographs.”304 The 
SJC approved this trial strategy while apparently maintaining its 
position in Avila.305 In this regard, the court stated that, “[a] 
substitute medical examiner may not, however, testify to facts in the 
underlying autopsy report where that report has not been 
admitted.”306 It is possible that the phrase “where that report has not 
been admitted” may have been a judicial slip of the tongue, 
particularly if Avila intended to teach that forensic autopsy reports 
are testimonial.307 It is also possible that the Reavis court was 
contemplating a situation in which the defendant did not object to 
the admission in evidence of the report.308 
Avila and Reavis, therefore, at least suggest that the forensic 
autopsy report constitutes testimonial hearsay. Insofar as the court’s 
opinions approved of the surrogate’s in-court opinion testimony,309 
Massachusetts could adopt a variant of the hybrid approach to the 
admissibility of forensic autopsy reports, an approach to be 
discussed later in this Article.310 
2. Michigan 
As a result of recent involvement of the Supreme Court of 
Michigan, it may be reasonable to place Michigan in the 
“testimonial column.” In 2010, the Court of Appeals of Michigan in 
People v. Lewis proclaimed that a forensic autopsy report was 
admissible as non-testimonial despite the admission of the report 
through a surrogate medical examiner.311 The court held that the 
autopsy report was prepared pursuant to a statutory requirement, 
“was not prepared primarily for use in a later criminal prosecution,” 
and the surrogate was subject to cross-examination regarding his 
opinions, which were based on the autopsy report.312 This was the 
recipe for a non-testimonial autopsy report. 
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In 2011, the Supreme Court of Michigan issued an order in 
Lewis affirming the result but vacating “that part of the . . . opinion 
holding that the autopsy report was not testimonial and, therefore, 
that its admission did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”313 The 
supreme court disagreed with the court of appeals application of a 
Michigan rule of evidence “and its determination that the autopsy 
report was not prepared in anticipation of litigation.”314 The court of 
appeals opinion was affirmed as the supreme court agreed “that the 
admission of the [autopsy] report was not outcome 
determinative.”315 
Of special interest is the concurrence contained in the order, 
which urges that the supreme court’s order did not decide “whether 
the autopsy report constituted testimonial hearsay evidence.”316 The 
concurring judge preferred that the supreme court directly address 
this issue.317 
Notwithstanding the concurrence, the Supreme Court of 
Michigan’s order in Lewis suggests that it was troubled by the 
characterization of the autopsy report as non-testimonial. Therefore, 
with caution, it seems fair to urge that Michigan has become another 
jurisdiction to recognize the testimonial nature of forensic autopsy 
reports. 
3. Missouri 
In 2007, a Missouri court of appeals addressed the precise issue 
in State v. Davidson.318 Here, a surrogate medical examiner testified 
at trial. The examining physician did not testify at trial “because she 
was ‘out of town on vacation or something.’”319 The victim’s 
autopsy report was admitted in evidence.320 The Davidson court 
referred to the state’s pre-Crawford practice of admitting forensic 
autopsy reports in evidence under the business records exception to 
the hearsay rule.321 Post-Crawford, however, the court held that the 
forensic autopsy report issued in the prosecution was testimonial.322 
It was prepared “at the request of law enforcement in anticipation of 
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a murder prosecution, and the report was offered to prove the 
victim’s cause of death.”323 The court then pronounced, “[w]hen an 
autopsy report is prepared for purposes of criminal prosecution, as 
this one was, the report is testimonial.”324 
4. New Mexico 
The evidentiary character of forensic autopsy reports has been 
the subject of two recent cases: State v. Jaramillo325 and State v. 
Navarette.326 
a. State v. Jaramillo 
In Jaramillo, which involved a prosecution for child abuse 
resulting in death, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy 
was no longer employed by the medical examiner’s office at the 
time of trial.327 He demanded a large fee to testify at trial that the 
State would not pay.328 A surrogate medical examiner testified at 
trial “to establish the cause and manner of [the victim’s] death.”329 
He “read directly from the autopsy report” and “testified to . . . 
specific observations and notations made during the autopsy.”330 
The autopsy report was admitted in evidence.331 
Referring to New Mexico case law, the Jaramillo court noted 
the testimonial nature of a forensic report that was based on “an 
exercise of judgment and analysis” and attributed this quality to the 
autopsy report.332 The court also found that “the autopsy report was 
prepared with the purpose of preserving evidence for criminal 
litigation” as it “was made with the intention of the medical 
examiner to establish the cause and manner of . . . death,” additional 
characteristics of a testimonial statement.333 Further, the Jaramillo 
court acknowledged the need for cross-examination of the 
examining pathologist, noting that “cross-examination is necessary 
to explore the boundaries of the expert’s qualifications and correct 
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application of scientific techniques and methods.”334 As previously 
mentioned, the pathologist who performed the forensic autopsy is no 
different than the physician who examined and treated a patient. 
Each relies on experience, training, skill, and judgment, the 
application of which can only be explored at trial through cross-
examination. 
b. State v. Navarette 
In 2013, in State v. Navarette, the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico followed Jaramillo and held that forensic autopsy reports 
are testimonial.335 Significantly, the Navarette court, in reliance on 
Bullcoming,336 stated “that when determining whether an out-of-
court statement is testimonial, there is no meaningful distinction 
between factual observations and conclusions requiring skill and 
judgment.”337 This pronouncement discounts the argument made by 
the proponents of admissibility, that forensic autopsy reports contain 
objective data, presumably of the type that would be reported in a 
similar fashion by any forensic pathologist. This position, rejected in 
New Mexico, would authorize a surrogate pathologist to testify 
because the surrogate would simply testify regarding objective 
autopsy findings and the surrogate’s “opinions” would be subject to 
cross-examination. 
5. North Carolina 
In State v. Locklear, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, with 
guidance supplied by Melendez-Diaz,338 held that forensic autopsy 
reports admitted in evidence through a surrogate medical examiner 
were testimonial.339 Curiously, the Locklear court suggested that the 
testimonial nature of forensic autopsy reports was recognized by 
Melendez-Diaz.340 To be sure, Melendez-Diaz, in a footnote, referred 
to the importance of confrontation, presumably to challenge 
“forensic analyses, such as autopsies.”341 It did not, however, 
conclude that forensic autopsy reports are testimonial, the admission 
into evidence of which violates the Confrontation Clause when the 
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defendant had no prior opportunity to confront and cross-examine 
the examining pathologist. 
6. Oklahoma 
In 2010, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Cuesta-
Rodriguez v. State held that a forensic autopsy report was 
testimonial.342 Here, the medical examiner who performed the 
autopsy and prepared the autopsy report had retired by the time of 
trial.343 A surrogate, the Chief Medical Examiner, testified at trial.344 
The surrogate “testified regarding the examination of the body 
conducted by [the medical examiner who performed the autopsy] 
and gave his own opinions on [the victim’s] injuries and cause of 
death based on . . . observations as recorded in [the] autopsy 
report.”345 The prosecution urged the admission of the autopsy 
report as a business record, the preparation of which the statute 
required for multiple possible purposes.346 
The Cuesta-Rodriguez court examined the statutory 
responsibilities of the medical examiner and held that a medical 
examiner must anticipate that a forensic “autopsy report involving a 
violent or suspicious death . . . should reasonably [be] expect[ed] to 
be used in a criminal prosecution.”347 The report would constitute 
testimonial evidence pursuant to Crawford and Melendez-Diaz.  
Cuesta-Rodriguez also addressed the issue of whether a 
surrogate witness may use the contents of an otherwise testimonial 
forensic autopsy report as the basis of trial opinion testimony when 
the autopsy report is not introduced in evidence.348 The answer is 
no. Applicable “evidence rules cannot trump the Sixth Amendments 
right of confrontation.”349 Therefore, a surrogate pathology witness, 
qualified as an expert, cannot base his or her trial opinions on 
evidence that would violate the Confrontation Clause due to its 
testimonial nature.350 
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7. Texas 
The appellate courts of Texas have twice recently pronounced 
the testimonial nature of forensic autopsy reports in cases involving 
the in-court testimony of surrogate medical examiners in which the 
reports were not offered into evidence.351 The courts sent mixed 
messages, however, as to whether a surrogate witness may base in-
court opinions on the review of testimonial autopsy reports. 
a. Martinez v. State 
In 2010, in Martinez v. State, a Texas court determined that the 
forensic autopsy report was testimonial.352 Here, a police “officer 
attended the autopsy and took photographs of the body.”353 The 
medical examiner could reasonably assume “that his autopsy report 
would be used prosecutorially.”354 Additionally, the court adeptly 
noted that the content of the autopsy report would support the 
opinions of the surrogate medical examiner only if the content was 
true and that this “use of testimonial statements” would offend the 
Confrontation Clause.355 
b. Wood v. State 
In 2009, in Wood v. State, a surrogate medical examiner 
provided in-court testimony.356 “The homicide detective who was 
the lead investigator in this case and a police evidence specialist 
attended the autopsy.”357 The court had no difficulty finding that the 
medical examiner who performed the autopsy “understood that the 
report containing her findings and opinions would be used 
prosecutorially.”358 
Curiously, the Wood court engaged in a tedious analysis as to 
whether the surrogate medical examiner could base his in-court 
opinions on a testimonial forensic autopsy report. First, the court 
held that “the Confrontation Clause was not offended when [the 
surrogate] testified to his own opinions regarding the nature and 
causes of [the victim’s] injuries and death, even though those 
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opinions were based in part on [the surrogate’s] review of [the] 
autopsy report.”359 Of course, this approach ignores the “house of 
cards” character of this form of opinion testimony. But then the 
Wood court noted that the surrogate “did more than merely offer his 
expert opinions. He also disclosed to the jury the testimonial 
statements in the autopsy report on which his opinions were 
based.”360 Because the contents of the forensic autopsy report only 
supported the surrogate’s in-court opinions if the contents were true, 
the disclosure of the forensic autopsy report contents violated the 
Confrontation Clause.361 
Frankly, it seems that the Wood court has recognized a 
distinction without a difference. The Confrontation Clause is no less 
involved when a surrogate medical examiner testifies to opinions 
based upon a testimonial forensic autopsy report than when the same 
witness discloses to the jury the specific findings contained in the 
report. In either case, the otherwise inadmissible report, testimonial 
in nature, informs the in-court opinion testimony solely due to its 
presumptive truth. Therefore, in either case, the forensic autopsy 
report as a testimonial statement is inadmissible as violative of the 
Confrontation Clause, and the surrogate’s opinions based on the 
report should be inadmissible as well. 
8. West Virginia 
In 2012, in State v. Kennedy, the West Virginia Supreme Court 
of Appeals addressed the classic scenario: a murder prosecution, an 
autopsy, an autopsy report prepared by the examining pathologist, a 
surrogate pathologist providing in-court testimony, and the autopsy 
report admitted in evidence.362 The surrogate pathologist also 
“offered testimony regarding the general methodology of 
performing autopsies.”363 
After reviewing relevant jurisprudence and noting the primary 
purpose of the autopsy report, the Kennedy court concluded “that, 
for purposes of use in criminal prosecutions, autopsy reports are 
under all circumstances testimonial.”364 Further, the court held that 
because a West Virginia statute365  
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compels the mandatory admission of an autopsy report or 
other testimonial document, in a criminal action, where the 
performing pathologist or analyst does not appear at trial and 
the State fails to establish that the pathologist or analyst is 
unavailable and that the accused has had a prior opportunity 
to cross-examine the witness, [the statute] is unconstitutional 
and unenforceable.366 
B. States Holding Forensic Autopsy Reports to be Non-Testimonial 
1. Arizona 
Quite recently, in State v. Medina, the Supreme Court of 
Arizona considered an automatic appeal from a murder conviction 
and death sentence.367 At issue on appeal was the admissibility of 
the forensic autopsy report, prepared by the examining pathologist, 
and the in-court testimony of a surrogate pathologist “who testified 
concerning the report’s conclusions and used the report and 
photographs of the body to make various independent conclusions 
about the death.”368  
The Supreme Court of Arizona correctly noted that “[t]he United 
States Supreme Court ha[d] not determined whether an autopsy 
report is testimonial.”369 In referring to U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and its primary purpose and solemnity tests,370 the 
court concluded that neither test was particularly helpful. The court 
pronounced, “[T]here is no binding rule for determining when 
reports are testimonial.”371 
Despite its recognition that neither the primary purpose nor 
solemnity tests were binding, the court applied both tests and 
concluded that the forensic autopsy report was not testimonial.372 
The purpose of the report “was not primarily to accuse a specified 
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individual” and was neither certified nor arose “from formal 
dialogue akin to custodial interrogation.”373 
Finally, the court had no problem with the in-court testimony of 
the surrogate pathologist. The in-court testimony revealed the 
surrogate’s “independent conclusions” and did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause under Arizona law.374 
2. California 
In People v. Dungo, the Supreme Court of California considered 
the in-court testimony of a surrogate pathologist–expert who opined 
on the cause of the victim’s death.375 The forensic autopsy report 
was not introduced in evidence.376 The surrogate pathology witness 
did not describe the victim’s cause of death as specified in the 
forensic autopsy report.377 The surrogate witness did describe the 
condition of the victim’s body based the surrogate’s review of the 
forensic autopsy report and autopsy photographs.378 Therefore, the 
forensic autopsy report informed the in-court opinions of the 
surrogate. 
Comparing the statements in the autopsy report, “describing the 
pathologist’s anatomical and physiological observations about the 
condition of the body” to “observations of objective fact in a report 
by a physician who, after examining a patient, diagnoses a particular 
injury or ailment and determines the appropriate treatment,” the 
Dungo court, guided by Melendez-Diaz,379 held those statements 
non-testimonial.380 
The Dungo court determined that “criminal investigation was 
not the primary purpose for the autopsy report’s description of the 
condition of [the victim’s] body; it was only one of several 
purposes” based on California law.381 The court adhered to this 
position even though a detective was present at the autopsy.382 
Consequently, in Dungo, the court did not find the necessary 
formality or primary purpose of the forensic autopsy report to 
implicate the defendant’s right of confrontation.383 
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3. Florida 
Banmah v. State384 concerned a murder and armed robbery 
prosecution in which a surrogate medical examiner testified about 
the autopsy findings of the medical examiner who performed the 
autopsy, a practice permitted by Florida case law.385 Without even a 
reference to U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Banmah court 
held that “autopsy reports are non-testimonial because they are 
prepared pursuant to a statutory duty, and not solely for use in 
prosecution.”386 
4. Illinois 
a. People v. Leach 
In 2012, in People v. Leach, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
addressed both aspects of the forensic autopsy evidentiary 
problem—the admission in evidence of the forensic autopsy report 
and the opinion testimony of a surrogate forensic pathologist.387 
Leach involved a murder conviction.388 At trial, the defendant 
moved in limine to prevent trial testimony from a surrogate medical 
examiner, but the motion did not address the admission of the 
forensic autopsy report.389 The prosecution’s predictable position 
was that the court should permit the testifying medical examiner, as 
an expert witness, to give opinions at trial and rely on materials from 
the medical examiner who performed the autopsy.390 The 
defendant’s motion was denied.391 
The surrogate medical examiner testified that “she had reviewed 
‘the autopsy protocol, the toxicology reports, [the] investigator’s 
report, and photographs’ that documented [the examining medical 
examiner’s] external and internal examinations of the body.”392 The 
surrogate also gave opinions as to cause and manner of death.393 
At trial, the court admitted the autopsy report into evidence 
without objection by the defendant.394 The defendant’s “posttrial 
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motion did not raise any issue in connection with the admission of 
the autopsy report itself.”395 However, the defendant did urge error 
in allowing the testimony of the surrogate medical examiner.396 
The defendant’s post-trial motion was denied.397 On appeal, the 
appellate court noted that the defendant did not object to the 
introduction of the autopsy report in evidence and did not raise the 
issue in the post-trial motion.398 The conviction was affirmed on 
appeal.399 
As to Crawford,400 the appellate court held that the autopsy 
report was a business record and that Crawford instructed that 
business records are not testimonial.401 Further, the appellate court 
approved an expert’s use of inadmissible evidence to explain the 
basis of an opinion as not violative of Crawford.402 
The Supreme Court of Illinois determined that it would address 
the issue of the admissibility of the forensic autopsy report because 
it “implicates a fundamental constitutional right.”403 The court first 
determined that the forensic autopsy report was admissible under the 
Illinois evidence rules as a business record or a public record.404 
Additionally, the forensic autopsy report was admissible pursuant to 
a specific Illinois statute providing for admissibility.405 
Next, the supreme court undertook an examination of 
Crawford,406 Melendez-Diaz,407 Bryant,408 Bullcoming,409 and 
Williams.410 It concluded that the forensic autopsy report was not 
testimonial.411 The report was “not prepared for the primary purpose 
of accusing a targeted individual,” and it was not prepared “for the 
primary purpose of providing evidence in a criminal case.”412 
Predictably, the court referred to the multiple purposes for which a 
forensic autopsy report may be used, concluding that the report is 
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“prepared in the normal course of operation of the medical 
examiner’s office, to determine the cause and manner of death, 
which, if determined to be homicide, could result in charges being 
brought.”413 The court then offered a strained analysis suggesting 
that: 
[T]he autopsy finding of homicide did not directly accuse 
defendant. Only when the autopsy findings are viewed in 
light of defendant’s own statement to the police is he linked 
to the crime. In short, the autopsy sought to determine how 
the victim died, not who was responsible, and, thus [the 
attending medical examiner] was not defendant’s accuser.414 
b. People v. Cortez 
Leach followed the opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois for 
the First District in People v. Cortez.415 There, the appellate court 
held the forensic autopsy report was not testimonial; that it was a 
business record; and curiously, that it “was not admitted to establish 
or prove some fact at trial and did not lend itself to establishing 
defendant’s guilt or innocence,” urging that “[t]he cause and manner 
of the victim’s death were not contested.”416 One might legitimately 
question the relevance of the forensic autopsy report if it was not 
admitted to prove a fact at trial. 
c. People v. Brewer 
It should be noted that the Appellate Court of Illinois for the 
First District recently followed Leach in People v. Brewer.417 Here, 
the court emphasized that the autopsy report did not “link[ ] Brewer 
to the shooting and it is only when the autopsy findings are viewed 
in light of Brewer’s own statement to the police and other evidence 
at trial is there a connection established between Brewer and the 
crime.”418 Further, the court approved the testimony of the surrogate 
medical examiner “‘even if it had the effect of offering the report for 
the truth of the matters asserted therein.’”419 
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5. Louisiana 
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the Second Circuit 
considered the admissibility of the forensic autopsy report 
(coroner’s report) and the surrogate pathology witness in State v. 
Russell.420 Here, the examining coroner died prior to trial.421 The 
coroner’s report was admitted into evidence over the defendant’s 
objection.422 The surrogate pathologist based his trial opinions in 
part on the review of the autopsy report.423 A Louisiana statute 
provided that “[a] coroner’s report . . . shall be competent evidence 
of death and the cause thereof, but not of any other fact.”424 The 
court held that neither proof of death nor cause of death as stated in 
a coroner’s report implicates an accused, and therefore, the report 
was non-testimonial.425 The court characterized “the information 
contained in the report [as] routine, descriptive, nonanalytical, and 
thus, nontestimonial in nature.”426 Of course, this characterization 
suggests that an autopsy report contains objective data, not subject 
to the varying skill and judgment among forensic pathologists, a 
characterization that this Article disputes.427 Even without a 
reference to Russell, another Louisiana appellate court has recently 
maintained this non-testimonial position.428 
6. New Jersey 
In 2013, a New Jersey appellate court concluded that the 
testimony of a surrogate medical examiner in a murder prosecution 
was constitutionally permissible.429 The court affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction in State v. Bass.430 “An autopsy determined 
that the bullet that killed [the victim] had entered through her back 
and exited through her chest, passing through her lung and heart.”431 
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The medical examiner who performed the autopsy and prepared the 
report died prior to trial.432 The testifying medical examiner did not 
participate in the autopsy and, therefore, was a surrogate witness. He 
did review the autopsy photographs and report and, at trial, 
“concurred with [the attending medical examiner’s] conclusions as 
to the cause and manner of . . . death.”433 The “autopsy report was 
not admitted into evidence, so . . . findings were only made known 
to the jury indirectly through the expert testimony of [the 
surrogate].”434 
The court noted, having reviewed the relevant Supreme Court 
cases, that “[i]t is obvious that the United States Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on these confrontation issues, in the aftermath of 
Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams, has been in a state of 
considerable flux.”435 Because the autopsy report was not admitted 
in evidence, the court did “not reach the controversial question of 
whether an autopsy report, by its very nature, is ‘testimonial’ for 
purposes of Crawford analysis.”436 
The court, however, noted that the surrogate witness 
“independently reviewed the evidence, including [the attending 
medical examiner’s] findings, to reach his own conclusions.”437 This 
position is a bit disingenuous as the surrogate medical examiner 
“concurred with [the attending medical examiner’s] conclusions as 
to the cause and manner of . . . death.”438 The court, despite having 
stated that it need not sound in on the testimonial or non-testimonial 
nature of the autopsy report, did just that, holding that the autopsy 
report was not “sufficiently ‘formalized’ to be considered 
‘testimonial’ under the test expressed in Justice Thomas’s 
concurring opinion in Williams.”439 In a footnote, the court also 
noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would likely have the 
opportunity to resolve this issue.440 
7. Ohio 
In State v. Craig, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed an 
aggravated murder conviction that involved an autopsy performed 
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before the suspect was arrested.441 The attending medical examiner 
retired prior to trial, and a surrogate medical examiner testified at 
trial.442 The autopsy report was admitted in evidence.443 Under Ohio 
law, the autopsy report was admissible as a public or business 
record, and the Supreme Court of Ohio, relying on Crawford,444 
held that business records are not testimonial, not having been 
prepared for litigation.445 
8. South Carolina 
In State v. Cutro, the Supreme Court of South Carolina noted 
that autopsy reports were excepted from the hearsay rule as public 
records.446 It analogized autopsy reports to business records and, 
therefore, pursuant to the guidance of Crawford, held that the 
autopsy report was not testimonial.447 
C. “Hybrid” Jurisdictions 
A court’s expression of the practical concern for the potential 
exclusion from evidence of the forensic autopsy report when the in-
court witness is a surrogate is as follows: 
It bears mentioning that the blanket prohibition on the 
admission of autopsy reports . . . could result in practical 
difficulties for murder prosecutions. If, for example, the 
medical examiner who performed the autopsy passes away 
before a perpetrator is apprehended and tried, barring the use 
in evidence of the autopsy report could, in some situations, 
effectively amount to a statute of limitations on murder, 
where none otherwise exists.448 
In order to combat the problem, an approach has been designed to 
permit the admission in evidence of “objective” findings contained 
in forensic autopsy reports. The basis of this approach is an 
assumption that autopsy findings are objective data as distinguished 
from the forensic pathologist’s opinions as to cause of death and 
manner of death, both of which require the use of analysis and 
judgment. Essentially, the theory is that findings on external and 
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internal examination of the victim’s body are not judgmental in 
nature, are not reliant on the skill of the examining pathologist, and 
would be duplicated if other pathologists had the opportunity to 
conduct the autopsy. Consequently, this approach concludes that the 
objective data—basic anatomical findings—are not testimonial, but 
the reporting of cause and manner of death is testimonial. 
An example of the hybrid approach is shown in People v. Hall, a 
New York case concerning a first-degree murder conviction.449 The 
victim’s autopsy was performed (and report prepared) by a medical 
examiner who was out of state by the time of trial.450 A surrogate 
medical examiner who had reviewed the autopsy report testified at 
trial.451 The testifying medical examiner “made some references to 
facts contained in the autopsy report, [but] emphasized that all of the 
conclusions she reached were her own.”452 The autopsy report was 
admitted into evidence in its entirety as a business record.453 
The Hall court relied on People v. Freycinet,454 which stands for 
the proposition that “the factual part of the [forensic] autopsy report 
is nontestimonial and admissible.”455 The Hall court pronounced 
that “Melendez-Diaz did not explicitly hold that autopsy reports are 
testimonial.”456 This analysis is based on the fact that the medical 
examiner is obligated to determine cause of death in circumstances 
that may not implicate a crime (e.g., suicide or sudden deaths when 
in apparent good health) and that the “factual portions of the autopsy 
report consisting primarily of contemporaneous observations and 
measurements” record “only what happened to the victim, [and do] 
not directly link [a] defendant to the crime.”457 Because the 
defendant may cross-examine the surrogate witness as to the 
“objective” data in the autopsy report and the surrogate’s “opinions” 
are his or her own as opposed to those of the attending pathologist, 
use of the surrogate witness does not implicate the Confrontation 
Clause. 
Maryland has adopted this hybrid approach as well. In Rollins v. 
State, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals considered a 
conviction for murder and other crimes.458 The defendant was 
charged with murder “after . . . [the] autopsy report concluded that 
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the cause of death was smothering and the manner of death was 
homicide.”459 The forensic autopsy report indicated that the 
attending medical examiner was aware of a death investigation.460 A 
surrogate medical examiner testified at trial, and her cause of death 
opinion was “based on the physical findings in [the attending 
medical examiner’s] autopsy report and other information contained 
in the file.”461 The trial court redacted from the autopsy report the 
opinion of the attending medical examiner “that the manner of death 
was homicide by asphyxiation.”462 The remainder of the report was 
admitted in evidence, consisting of “routine and objectively 
ascertained findings . . . including the documentation of 
hemorrhaging to the mouth and other physical conditions of the 
victim”463 In a footnote in its opinion, the court referred to three 
sections of the autopsy report it believed were “illustrative of the 
medical examiner’s findings of the condition of the deceased which 
were objectively ascertained, generally reliable, and normally 
undisputed: Head[] (Central Nervous System) . . . Cardiovascular 
System . . . [and] Respiratory System.”464 
The hybrid approach, therefore, spares criminal prosecutions 
from potential failure by using a hearsay exception for the admission 
of the forensic autopsy report and dissecting from the report the 
opinions of the attending pathologist as to cause of death, as it is 
only those opinions that have “testimonial” dignity. The surrogate 
witness, despite having reviewed the autopsy reports, may then 
testify to his or her own opinions as to cause and manner of death 
and is subject to cross-examination as to those opinions, thus 
avoiding violation of the Confrontation Clause. The surrogate may 
testify to “objective data” (pathological findings) contained in the 
autopsy report without implicating the Confrontation Clause. 
How, then, is this interesting evidentiary issue properly 
resolved? Are forensic autopsy reports testimonial, non-testimonial, 
or of a hybrid character? The federal courts of appeals and state 
courts are simply split. The United States Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed the issue. The next Section of this Article argues 
that medicine assists in the search for the answer. 
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V. THEVERDICT—FORENSIC AUTOPSY REPORTS ARE 
“TESTIMONIAL” 
At this point, the parameters of the inquiry are well known and 
understood as follows: 
• A death occurs, possibly due to criminal conduct. • A crime scene investigation occurs, likely attended by 
police and persons employed by the medical examiner or 
coroner. • The victim is taken to the office of the medical examiner 
or coroner. • The medical examiner or coroner receives some 
investigatory information, and a pathologist performs a 
forensic autopsy. • Law enforcement personnel are or are not in attendance 
at the autopsy. • The attending forensic pathologist prepares a forensic 
autopsy report containing autopsy findings and opinions 
on cause and manner of death. • The criminal defendant has or has not been arrested or 
charged by the time of the autopsy. • The pathologist who performed the autopsy retires, dies, 
will not return for trial, or cannot be located and does not 
testify at the trial of the accused. • The criminal prosecution ensues, and a surrogate 
pathologist testifies at trial for the prosecution. The 
surrogate pathologist has reviewed the forensic autopsy 
report, and it forms the basis of the testifying 
pathologist’s opinions at trial. • The forensic autopsy report (or some portion thereof) is 
admitted in evidence. At trial, the defendant cannot 
confront and cross-examine the pathologist who 
performed the autopsy and prepared the report. • The defendant is convicted. 
Also apparent is that courts are concerned with the administration of 
criminal justice and that the inadmissibility of forensic autopsy 
reports will hamper, if not derail, criminal prosecutions.465 
As to the legal analysis, it is clear that a forensic autopsy report, 
if offered in evidence at trial for its truth, is classic hearsay. The 
report may very well fall within a recognized exception to the 
hearsay rule—the business record exception,466 the public record 
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exception,467 or an exception created by a state-specific statute.468 
Further, since Crawford, a well-recognized exception to the hearsay 
rule will not trump the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.469 
Therefore, the issue is whether forensic autopsy reports are 
testimonial. 
Medical examiners and coroners perform their duties pursuant to 
legal authority and forensic autopsy reports are formal documents. 
Forensic autopsies are performed for a number of reasons, not the 
least of which is to investigate violent, and likely criminal, deaths. 
Forensic pathologists do not perform autopsies in a vacuum in the 
absence of some investigatory facts. It is true that the autopsy report 
will not typically, if ever, identify the criminal perpetrator. The 
forensic pathologist will, nevertheless, know that the details of a 
forensic autopsy may constitute evidence in a criminal prosecution. 
Forensic autopsy reports do not look like transcripts of in-court 
or deposition testimony. They are, however, “official” documents. 
The office of the medical examiner or coroner clearly issues the 
reports. The attending pathologist then signs and dates the report. 
Therefore, they are issued pursuant to appropriate authority for 
official purposes, and their use as evidence in a criminal trial is 
foreseeable. 
It is not necessary to look only to the law as the source of the 
formality attributable to forensic autopsy reports or to confirm that 
forensic pathologists must anticipate that their work will contribute 
to evidence used at a criminal trial. The National Association of 
Medical Examiners (NAME), the professional organization for 
those “who perform the official duties of the medicolegal 
investigation of deaths,”470 has published “Forensic Autopsy 
Performance Standards.”471 These standards emphasize the 
following: 
• “Medicolegal death investigation officers . . . are charged 
by statute to investigate deaths deemed to be in the 
public interest—serving . . . the criminal justice, civil 
justice and public health systems.”472 • “Just as a surgeon does not operate without first 
preparing a history and physical examination, so must 
the forensic pathologist ascertain enough history and 
circumstances . . . to decide whether a forensic autopsy is 
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indicated and to direct the forensic autopsy toward 
relevant case questions.”473 • “The forensic pathologist or representative shall: collect, 
package, label, and preserve all evidentiary items” and 
“document chain of custody of all evidentiary items.”474 • The need for a formal, written, signed and dated 
“postmortem examination report” that will include 
observations and descriptions of injuries, a detailed 
description of findings, “a list of the diagnoses and 
interpretations,” and cause and manner of death.475 
Thus, NAME clearly recognizes the formality of the forensic 
autopsy report as well as its evidentiary significance. So much for 
the argument against forensic autopsy report formality. 
 The crux of the confrontation issue—the need to confront and 
cross-examine the attending forensic pathologist—is that forensic 
pathologists are physicians. Physicians exercise judgment and make 
mistakes, whether they treat living, breathing patients or perform 
forensic autopsies. Courts that have adopted the view that forensic 
autopsy reports simply memorialize objective data are misinformed. 
Neither forensic pathologists nor forensic autopsy reports are 
fungible. Forensic pathologists would not necessarily report the 
same findings if each were, hypothetically, able to perform the same 
autopsy. 
Prior to commenting on the specifics of the judgment of a 
forensic pathologist, a few comments on basic, clinical medical 
judgment are appropriate and provide some needed context 
regarding the role and responsibility of a physician. It has been 
urged that “[t]he quality of clinical judgment rendered by an 
individual physician who is faced by a patient seeking help is 
probably the most important determinant of the quality of the care 
he will provide.”476 Physician judgment constitutes one of the 
components of “assessment of clinical competence.”477 Clinical 
judgment has been defined as: 
the totality of the mental processes involved in all stages at 
which the clinician collects and interprets data; formulates a 
problem statement, confirms and refutes diagnostic 
hypotheses; considers, plans, and implements possible 
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diagnostic and therapeutic options, tests, and interventions; 
and evaluates likelihoods and outcomes.478 
Therefore, there is no underestimation of the significance of clinical 
medical judgment. Certainly, lapses in clinical medical judgment 
lead to medical errors. 
Undoubtedly, clinical medical judgment, and lapses therefore, 
may be analogized to forensic pathology. That forensic pathologists 
make mistakes is well known to medical literature. In 1956, Moritz 
detailed these errors in his work, Classical Mistakes in Forensic 
Pathology.479 Among these mistakes, he described the following: 
• “Mistakes of Not Being Aware of the Objective of the 
Medicolegal Autopsy”;480 • “Mistake of Performing an Incomplete Autopsy”;481 • “Mistakes Resulting from Nonrecognition or 
Misinterpretation of Postmortem Changes”;482 • “Mistake of Failing to Make an Adequate Examination 
and Description of External Abnormalities”;483 • “Mistake of Confusing the Objective with the Subjective 
Sections of the Protocol”;484 • “Mistake of Not Examining the Body at the Scene of the 
Crime”;485 • “Mistake of Substituting Intuition for Scientifically 
Defensible Interpretation”;486 • “Mistake of Not Making Adequate Photographs of the 
Evidence”;487 • “Mistake of Not Exercising Good Judgment in the 
Taking or Handling of Specimens for Toxicologic 
Examination”;488 and • “Errors . . . that result in the production of undesirable 
artifacts or in the destruction of valid evidence.”489 
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That these mistakes occur in forensic pathology confirms the 
notion that “an autopsy cannot be any better than the understanding 
of the person who performs it.”490 “The tragic consequence of a 
poorly performed, partial, or superficial autopsy is an unjust or 
unrealistic verdict . . . .”491 The forensic pathologist who fails in the 
forensic autopsy performance “may well be sowing the seeds of 
forensic disaster.”492  
The only vehicle by which a criminal defendant may explore the 
subjectivity involved in the performance of the forensic autopsy—to 
question the judgment of the examining forensic pathologist—is 
cross-examination. The in-court testimony of the surrogate forensic 
pathologist who examines the autopsy report prepared by the 
examining pathologist is an inadequate substitute. The surrogate 
witness is not the physician who was required to be familiar with the 
facts and the autopsy protocol, examine the victim’s body, perform 
the autopsy procedure, make and report findings, and report the 
cause and manner of death. The cross-examination of the surrogate 
yields very little. The surrogate can rely on the autopsy findings 
with impunity. There is simply little to be gained by the defendant in 
the effort to cross-examine the surrogate. Cross-examination is the 
great truth-seeking test,493 but it is an empty exercise when the 
surrogate testifies at trial. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the United States Supreme Court has addressed the 
testimonial nature of certain forensic evidence, it has not addressed 
the forensic pathology report. Further, Supreme Court jurisprudence 
including and since Crawford494 is ambiguous, confusing, and not 
particularly predictive on this point. “Testimonial” statements 
include testimony, but that is not a requirement. “Testimonial” 
statements suggest statements made with some degree of solemnity, 
formality, and authority, but those characteristics are moving targets. 
“Testimonial” statements should also have evidentiary 
consequences. There should be some understanding (if not 
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anticipation) by the declarant that the statement will be used for 
evidence at a criminal trial. 
The forensic autopsy report qualifies as a testimonial statement. 
Forensic pathologists are obligated to perform autopsies in cases of 
violent or otherwise criminally caused deaths. Forensic autopsy 
reports are formal, legal documents that are prepared pursuant to a 
formal protocol. They do not identify the culprit, but they do 
formally describe autopsy findings and report the cause and manner 
of death. Forensic pathologists are quite aware that their autopsy 
reports will be evidentiary and that the testimony of a forensic 
pathologist will be sought at trial. Because the examining 
pathologist is a physician who exercises judgment throughout the 
performance and reporting of the autopsy, the accused must be 
entitled to confront and cross-examine the examining forensic 
pathologist to test the validity of the autopsy and the pathologist’s 
observations, conclusions, and opinions. 
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, what remains is a 
split of authority in the circuit courts of appeals and the state courts 
as to the testimonial nature of the forensic autopsy report. The non-
testimonial characterization of the forensic autopsy report is 
convenient for the administration of criminal justice and results 
when courts do not appreciate the medicine that is at the core of the 
forensic autopsy. Medical decision-making and medical judgment 
cannot be cross-examined if the examining pathologist is not a 
witness at trial. When the examining pathologist is unable to testify 
at trial, the inadmissibility of the forensic autopsy report and the 
surrogate pathologist’s testimony is the correct price to pay in order 
to preserve the protection of the Confrontation Clause. 
  
